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A Case of Predatory Pricing?
Louis P hlips* Ireneo Miguel MoRASf 
September 1992
Abstract
In December 1985, a fine was imposed on the Dutch multinational A kzo for 
predatory abuse of a dominant position. An appeal by A kzo was rejected by 
the Court of Justice of the Communities in July 1991. This note suggests that, 
according to the facts reported by the Commission itself, this is a case of active 
competition, not of predation.
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In tro d u ctio n
In December 1985, a fine of 10 million ECU, payable in guilders, was imposed on 
Akzo Chemie BV by the Commission of the European Economic Communities1 for 
infringement of Article 86 of the Roman Treaty, that is, for abuse of a dominant 
position. A kzo allegedly abused the dominant position which it holds in the E ec 
organic peroxides market by a policy of selective and below-cost price cutting designed 
to damage the business of Engineering and Chemical Supplies Ltd (Ecs), a small 
producer of organic benzoyl peroxide in the United Kingdom, and to exclude it as a 
competitor. Although the concept of “predatory pricing” is not used explicitly by the 
Commission, it is clear from the arguments used that the Commission did consider the 
alleged abuse as predatory. Is this a correct interpretation of the facts (as described 
in the decision)? This note argues that it is not.2
1 T h e  F acts3
Akzo Chemie, a division of the Dutch multinational chemical and fibres group Akzo 
NV, is a multimarket multiproduct firm, for which the UK market for flour additives 
— on which the alleged aggression occurred — is a relatively small sub-market. ECS, 
on the other hand, is a small privately owned company whose principal activity is the 
production of flour additives including benzoyl-peroxide-based bleaching agents. In 
the E ec, the use of this particular bleaching agent for flour is authorized only in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. There is therefore a well delineated local market for this 
particular flour additive.
1 Official Journal of the European Communities, No L374 of 31 December 1985.
2 An appeal by A k zo  was rejected on 3 July 1991 by the Court of Justice of the Communities. 
See Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour et du Tribunal de première instance, 1991, vol. 7, Part 
I, pages 1-3439-3477. The Advocate-General of the Court, C.O. Lenz, had concluded on 19 April 
1989 that A k z o ’s appeal should be accepted on the grounds that the Commission did not prove that 
A k zo  had a dominant position! See pages 1-3396-3438 of the same Recueil ....
3 In this section the facts, as reported by the Commission, are put in a chronological order. In the 
published decision, facts are reported in the order necessary to corroborate the different arguments 




























































































However, benzoyl peroxide (BP) is also (and mainly) used as an initiator in the 
polymer industry. Let us denote this use as the “plastics market” . In 1979, E cs 
began to produce benzoyl peroxide products for the bulk polymer industry and to sell 
these in the UK. By September 1979, a first shipment was dispatched to B a s f  of 
Ludwigshafen (Germany), one of A kzo’s major customers in the polymer industry, 
at a price 15 to 20% below A kzo’s then price. ECS thus first entered A kzo’s UK 
sub-market for plastics and then entered one of A kzo’s continental plastics markets, 
which A kzo shared with smaller suppliers.4
W hat was A k z o ’s reaction? Its first reaction was a series of threats, which the 
Commission describes as follows (O.J., L374/7, I< 26):
“Ecs alleged that the A k zo  reaction to its expansion was swift. On or 
about 14 November 1979 senior A k zo  UK representatives had requested 
an urgent meeting with Ecs which was scheduled for two days later. ECS 
alleged that in this first meeting direct threats were made by A k zo  UK, 
that unless Ecs withdrew from the plastics market retaliation from A k zo  
UK would follow in the form of both overall price reductions and selective 
cuts aimed at Ecs’ customers. These price reductions would be concen­
trated in the flour additives sector as it would cause the most harm to Ecs.
A k z o  UK had said it was prepared to go down to below cost if necessary, 
the more profitable side of its business supporting the price reduction ven­
ture ( . . . ) .  An alternative possibility canvassed by A k zo  was that it might 
even buy out E cs so as to neutralize the competition. E cs also alleged 
tha t a second meeting took place about a fortnight later when the A k zo  
UK representatives were joined by the head office product manager from 
A k z o  Chemie in the Netherlands and the threats were repeated. A few 
days later E cs applied for and was granted an injunction under Article 86 
of the E ec Treaty in an ex parte hearing in the High Court in London.”
From a legal point of view, these threats are important, since they can be (and 
were) used by the antitrust authority to establish predatory intent, the more so as
4 The scenario strongly resembles the one imagined by Easley et al. (1985), except that Akzo did 




























































































they were directed to the flour additives market rather than the plastics market. For 
the economist, the interesting question (not considered by the Commission) is whether 
A k z o ’s threat was a credible one.5 It occurred after two successive entries in A k z o ’s 
British and German sub-markets for plastics. The fact that the fight would have been 
located in the UI< market for flour additives, E c s’s main market, rather than in the 
plastics markets where the entries occurred, implied more harm to E cs and smaller 
costs to AKZO, and thus did not reduce its entry-deterring nature. From a game- 
theoretic point of view, we have a repeated game situation of the chain store paradox 
type. However, it is well known that in perfect sub-game equilibrium, threats of this 
nature are not credible in such games when information is perfect and complete. On 
the one hand, A k z o  was perfectly informed about the entrant’s moves. On the other 
hand, given the long history of friendly collaboration between the two firms in the UI< 
market for flour additives, it is unlikely that there was (that Mother Nature had chosen) 
a positive probability that A k zo  is a predator — as in Kreps and Wilson (1982) — so 
that information was “complete” . Notice indeed that, all through the seventies, A k zo  
had in fact fixed the UK prices for flour additives (with regular increments of 10%) 
and that ECS had always followed these increases.
At any rate, whether the threat was credible or not, a settlement was reached 
out of court. AKZO agreed to pay E cs’s legal costs and undertook not to reduce its 
normal selling prices for benzoyl peroxide in the UK or elsewhere for either plastics or 
flour additives. In the game-theoretic jargon, A k zo  made a binding commitment to 
eliminate predation from its action set, thus indicating that it was willing to collabo­
rate. A k z o  probably expected ECS to remain a  price follower on the flour additives 
market. That this is a reasonable explanation is confirmed by the fact that A k zo  
again increased its prices for flour additives to its UK customers by 10% in early 1980, 
that is, right after the settlement.
5 A k zo  claims that the meetings had been a mere “communications exercise” to explain that a 
“more competitive” sales policy for flour additives would be adopted. According to the Advocate- 
General of the Court, a senior sales manager of A kzo  UK wrote a note stating that he thought the 
threats were “vain” (menaces “vaines”) since A kzo  had admitted previously that its flour additives 
branch was not profitable. This manager also indicated that he did not think A k zo  would (or 
intended to) launch a price war and that it wanted Ecs out of the flour additives market. See Recueil 




























































































The preceding sets the stage for the events to come. E c s’s complaint to the EEC 
Commission (in June 1982) was indeed based on the claim that A kzo had attempted 
to put it out of business by a sustained and systematic campaign of price cutting 
since the end of 1980.
In order to be able to follow the story of this price undercutting, it is necessary 
to describe the structure of the flour additives market in the UI< and Ireland on both 
the supply and the demand side. There were three suppliers of a full range of flour 
additives, with the following market shares (in 1982):
A kzo UK: 52%
ECS: 35%
Diaflex: 13%.
(Note that Diaflex bought its raw material, concentrated benzoyl peroxide, from 
AKZO.) The customers and their buying shares were:
R hm , Spillers and Allied Mills: 85%
“Large independents” : 10%
“Small independents”: 5%
with R hm , Spillers and Allied Mills of roughly comparable size. These customers were 
supplied as follows:
RHM: by A kzo and Diaflex;
Spillers: by A kzo and, in second order until 1982, by Diaflex;
Allied Mills: by ECS (and one of the mills by A kzo);
Independent mills: ECS had 2/3 and A kzo 1/3 until 1982. (From 1982
onwards, A kzo had 2/3 and ECS 1/3.)
In other words, ECS did not supply R hm nor Spillers. Its prices to Allied Mills, 
its sole major customer, were generally about 10% below A kzo UK’s prices to the 
two other majors. Its prices to the independent mills were also substantially below 
A kzo UK’s. In spite of this price differential, A kzo UK had been able to maintain 
its share of the market, including the larger part of the business of R hm and Spillers. 
E cs maintained that its production costs were lower than A kzo UK’s and stated that 




























































































When A k zo  UK increased its prices to its usual UI< customers in early 1980, 
Ecs did not react, as it had done over the past decade, by following the price increase. 
Instead, it kept its 1979 price, so that the customary price gap between Ecs and A k zo  
widened. A k z o ’s two main customers (the milling groups Spillers and R hm) then 
asked ECS for a quotation for supplying flour additives. The Commission describes 
Ecs’s answer as follows (O.J., 374/9, §36 and 37):
“( . . . )  In March 1980 ECS quoted to Spillers prices of £532 per tonne for 
BP 16% and £336 per tonne for PB (potassium bromate) 10%. (These 
quotes corresponded exactly with the prices then offered by Ecs to Allied 
Mills (its main customer) while A kzo UK’s prices to Spillers were then 
£605 and £405, respectively.) The response of A kzo UK (whose repre­
sentative was shown the ECS quotation) was that it did not wish to lose 
any business whatever to Ecs and it adjusted its price downwards to match 
the Ecs quote.
( . . . )
Later in the year (towards October) Spillers requested quotations for a 
fixed price contract of six or 12 months’ duration from all three suppliers 
of flour additives. Ecs again quoted for its standard product the same 
prices as it had offered earlier in the year, but at the request of Spillers 
reduced prices of £512 and £309 were offered for a special cheap mixture 
using only gypsum instead of the normal inert filler. Later the offer for the 
cheap mix was increased by Ecs by £5,90 to cover the cost of an additive 
to  ensure better flow characteristics. Diaflex also quoted, initially, £530 
and £335 per tonne; then a reduced offer of £517 and £327 for 12 months 
or £490 and £310 for a six months’ contract. (The Diaflex product uses 
the cheaper gypsum filler.)
Spillers again gave A k zo  UK full details (including copy correspondence) 
of the quotes received from both the other suppliers. With the knowledge 
of what the other suppliers had offered, A k zo  UK quoted for its standard 




























































































price which had been offered by either of the other suppliers for a cheap 
mix) and took the business on the basis that Spillers obtained its total 
requirements from A kZO UK.”
A k z o ’s other main customer (the milling group R h m ) almost simultaneously 
made similar moves and received similar quotations from Ecs, which were matched 
by A k z o . However, in late 1980 A k zo  did launch a counter-attack, by approaching 
Ecs’s main customer (Allied Mills) — first as a group and then through its individual 
members — with new prices of £517,90 and £314,90. In December 1980, A k zo  also 
approached the independent mills with special offers. The end of the story is this 
0O.J., L 374/11, §41):
“The result of these systematic low price offers from A kzo UK — which 
were assiduously followed up — was that Ecs gradually lost the business of 
its three most important large independent customers plus several individ­
ual Allied Mills. The custom of the remaining mills was only kept by price 
reductions to match the A kzo UK quotes. In about January 1983 A kzo 
UI< lowered its price offers to the Allied Mills and to the independents still 
further, and Ecs to retain its customers was again obliged to decrease its 
prices despite substantial cost increases for labour and raw materials.”
In July 1983, minimum prices for flour additives were imposed on A k z o  by the 
Commission (Decision 83/462/C ee of 29 July 1983) as a provisional measure.
2 P red a to ry  P r ic in g  or A c tiv e  C o m p etitio n ?
Is this a story of predatory pricing or of active competition? Economic theory6 suggests 
that predatory pricing occurs only if a  number of conditions are simultaneously met. 
First, the aggressor is a multimarket firm (possibly a multi-product firm). If we assume 
that A k zo  was the aggressor, then this first condition is obviously met. Second, the 
predator attacks after entry has occurred in one of its markets. At the end of 1979, ECS




























































































did enter A kzo’s plastic market, both in the UI< and in Germany. A kzo’s reaction to 
this entry was a series of threats, followed by an increase in its prices for flour additives 
to its UK customers by 10%. It was a “regular” price increase: for years, A kzO had 
been increasing its prices every year by 10%. This is the behaviour of a dominant firm, 
convinced that it still is the price leader. No predation so far!
In fact, it was ECS that started cutting prices by not following the price leader, 
with the result that the customary price differential between ECS and A kzo widened. 
Even more, Ecs went as far as to make offers at its earlier prices to some of Akzo’s 
main UK customers. Clearly, ECS turned into a price setter and started a price war 
to get the price below the new price quoted by Akzo. Given the settlement reached 
in 1979, Ecs could expect Akzo’s hands to be bound.
Akzo had no choice but to follow by adjusting its prices to the quotations made 
by Ecs. In what was practically a duopoly situation — Diaflex did not count much — 
the only price it could adjust to was the competitor’s price. It is hard to understand, 
therefore, in what sense the Commission objects in §40 of its decision to Akzo’s not 
calculating its low prices “by reference to a market price or the price then being paid 
by the customer” . (When, later on, ECS had to adjust to quotations made by Akzo, 
the Commission did not find this objectionable.) To construe Akzo’s price adjustment 
as a case of predatory pricing, one would first have to establish a direct link between 
E cs’s 1979 entry into the plastics market and an attack by Akzo. We do not see any 
such link. Akzo’s “counter-attack” (around December 1980) appears as the reaction 
of a dominant firm that lost its price leadership and tries to discipline a small deviant . 
Since this sort of discipline, as displayed by Ecs in the seventies, is not objected to 
by the Commission, it is difficult to find efforts to restore it objectionable, the more 
so as in the event these efforts led to more price competition.
Our reasoning, in the preceding paragraphs, is based on the assumption that 
E cs had acquired a sufficiently large cost advantage to become the price leader, its 
small size notwithstanding. Note, indeed, that the price leader is not necessarily the 
firm that has the largest market share (see Ono, 1982, p. 15). A kzo does not seem 
to have understood this. Nor did it understand that, if ECS was truly the new price 




























































































counter-attack Ecs was then disequilibrium behaviour.
In Article 1 of its decision, the Commission makes the point that A kzo infringed 
Article 86 of the Roman Treaty by offering flour additives to the customers of ECS, in 
this counter-attack, “at unreasonably low prices designed to damage Ecs’s business 
viability in that Ecs was obliged either to abandon the customer to A kzo Chemie 
BV or to match a loss-making price in order to retain the customer.” It would be 
rather tedious to go through a detailed comparison of the individual price quotations. 
The following remarks should suffice to raise serious doubts about the Commission’s 
claim: 1) Since Ecs did not follow A kzo’s 10% price increase, it may be thought
that the 1979 prices were profitable enough for Ecs (possibly because of its declared 
cost advantage); 2) If Ecs’s cost advantage was of the order of 10%, then A kzo’s 
undercutting could not have been too damaging: its price quotations were of the order 
of 2%, 5%, 8% or 11% below those of Ecs, depending on whether the customer was 
its own or that of its competitor; 3) By January 1983, Ecs was still resisting the 
price cutting, retaining at least 70% of its 1980 sales level.
Note, finally, that to establish effective predation, it would remain to show that 
Ecs’s entry value became negative in the plastics market and that AKZO was able 
to compensate its alleged losses in the UK flour additives market by later gains in its 
plastics markets resulting from blocked or delayed entry. No evidence to tha t effect 
was made available nor even discussed by the Commission. Not only did Ecs continue 
its sales in the plastics market — which, as such, is not incompatible with predatory 
pricing — but it even took, in 1981. a minority share in a German company tha t acts 
as its agent for its sales in the continental plastics market. If anything, this suggests 
that Ecs’s entry value remained positive in that market.
To sum up, it is clear to us that the UK flour additives market moved from 
a dominant firm situation towards a more competitive one as a result of the initial 
low price quotations by ECS (possibly resulting, in turn, from a miscalculation about 
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